July 9, 2024

Hon. Kathi Vidal
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
600 Dulany Street
Alexandria, VA 22314

Submitted via: https://www.regulations.gov

Re: Terminal Disclaimer Practice to Obviate Nonstatutory Double Patenting; Docket No.: PTO-P-2024-0003

Dear Director Vidal:


IPO is an international trade association representing a “big tent” of diverse companies, law firms, service providers and individuals in all industries and fields of technology that own, or are interested in, intellectual property rights. IPO membership includes over 125 companies and spans over 30 countries. IPO advocates for effective and affordable IP ownership rights and offers a wide array of services, including supporting member interests relating to legislative and international issues; analyzing current IP issues; providing information and educational services; supporting and advocating for diversity, equity, and inclusion in IP and innovation; and disseminating information to the public on the importance of IP rights.

IPO’s vision is the global acceleration of innovation, creativity, and investment necessary to improve lives. The Board of Directors has adopted a strategic objective to foster diverse engagement in the innovation ecosystem and to integrate diversity, equity, and inclusion in all its work to complement IPO’s mission of promoting high quality and enforceable IP rights and predictable legal systems for all industries and technologies.

IPO has significant concerns about the proposed rule. As written, the rule would render all claims of a patent unenforceable as a result of the invalidity of any claim in another patent encompassed by a terminal disclaimer. The rule does not contemplate any claim-by-claim analysis to determine which claims are, in fact, patentably indistinct from the invalidated claim. As a result, a novel and nonobvious invention may be denied patent protection simply because a claim directed to a different invention is found invalid. This proposed approach is inconsistent with governing statutes and constitutes substantive rulemaking outside the USPTO’s rulemaking authority. The proposed rule, as drafted, will create significant negative consequences for patent applicants and the patent system as a whole. Accordingly, IPO recommends that the USPTO withdraw the proposed rule in its current form.
I. THE USPTO LACKS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE PROPOSED RULE

The USPTO’s authority derives from statutes enacted by Congress and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides general procedures for USPTO rulemaking. Important limitations on this authority include the inability to: (i) establish regulations inconsistent with statutes; and (ii) undertake substantive rulemaking.1 The proposed rule exceeds the authority of the USPTO because it is inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), 282(a), and 288 and constitutes substantive rulemaking beyond what Congress has legislated.

1. The USPTO has no statutory authority to issue the proposed rule.

Section 253 of Title 35 governs terminal disclaimers, which are used to overcome certain types of double patenting rejections by disclaiming the terminal part of the term of a patent subject to a non-statutory double patenting rejection. Section 253(a) states “[w]henever a claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid.” This requirement also appears in 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(a) and 288. The proposed rule contradicts these statutes by eliminating the requirement that validity, and, accordingly, enforceability of the claims be determined on a claim-by-claim basis.

Section 288 evinces the statutory intent to prevent the invalidity of one claim from infecting the enforceability of a patent’s other claims.2 But under the proposed rule, the invalidity of one claim would preclude the enforceability of another. The USPTO’s statutory authority does not permit imposing such new substantive limits regarding the filing and processing of terminal disclaimers, particularly those that impact a patent owner’s rights by reducing the term of a validly granted patent contrary to Congressional intent.

2. The proposed rule exceeds the USPTO’s procedural rulemaking authority.

The proposed rule, which will have a dramatic impact on continuation practice and the enforceability of patent holders’ rights, constitutes substantive rulemaking. It discourages the filing of continuation applications because a terminal disclaimer filed under the proposed rule might render related patents in the entire family unenforceable—an end-run around the statutory framework governing continuation practice as defined by Congress. Under 35 U.S.C. § 120, applicants are allowed to file continuation applications, which, subject to certain criteria, are entitled to the same priority date as the original application with no limitations imposed on the subject matter of the claims, provided they otherwise meet the requirements of patentability.

As an administrative agency, the USPTO cannot undermine or restrict these statutory rights without explicit legislative authorization. In Tafas v. Doll, the Federal Circuit rejected the USPTO’s attempt to limit the number of continuation applications an applicant could file, holding that such limits were substantive and that the USPTO lacked statutory authority to impose them.3 As in Tafas, this proposed rule limits the patentee’s ability to obtain and enjoy the full scope of patent rights in continuing applications under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Reasoning by analogy, the USPTO lacks authority to promulgate the proposed rule.

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1 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to the conduct of proceedings in the PTO; it does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 288 (“Whenever a claim of a patent is invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of the patent which may be valid.”)
3 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The USPTO mistakenly relies on *In re Van Ornum* as authority for the proposed rule “placing conditions upon enforcement” of patents tied by terminal disclaimers. But *Van Ornum* does not confer on the USPTO substantive rulemaking authority over terminal disclaimers. There, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals addressed a *procedural* requirement for terminal disclaimers—that enforceability depends on common ownership. This was consistent with an earlier appellate court decision creating the common ownership requirement, a rule the USPTO later adopted. In contrast, the current proposal requires a *de facto* admission of obviousness by the patent owner for all claims in a patent such that an invalidity determination on a single claim in one patent would render unenforceable all claims in another patent tied to it by a terminal disclaimer, regardless of the claims’ subject matter. This is inconsistent with many Federal Circuit decisions that have upheld the right to independently enforce terminally disclaimed patents. Insofar as a patent is a right to exclude, no meaningful difference exists for a patent owner between the effect of the USPTO’s proposed rule—that a patent is unenforceable—and a determination that the claims of an affected patent are invalid. The effect of the proposed rule will be to nullify unasserted patents contrary to decisions like *Ortho*.

This proposed rule is also manifestly unjust because it allows invalidating the entire “linked” patent family even when the invalidated claim has nothing to do with the other claims and is not the basis for the double patenting rejection. It is not uncommon for patents to have more than one independent claim. This result is unfair and contrary to the spirit of patent statutes.

### 3. The proposed rule disregards the separation of powers.

The principle of separation of powers contemplates distinct roles for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The USPTO’s primary function in the patent system is to examine applications and grant patents. Patent enforcement is within the purview of the courts, governed by statutory provisions under the U.S. Code, *inter alia*, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271–299, which set forth the requirements to obtain a patent and patent owners’ rights and remedies for infringement. The proposed rule, which would limit patent enforcement post-issuance, interferes with this established framework for patent enforcement. Congress has expressly provided circumstances where an otherwise validly granted patent could be held invalid if certain post-issuance conditions are not met, but specified no such rule regarding terminal disclaimers. The USPTO may not create such a new rule *sua sponte*.

Current procedures concerning terminal disclaimers merely restate what is required by courts, while the proposed rule creates additional requirements for what the USPTO considers to be an acceptable terminal disclaimer, where non-compliance would result in final rejection of the claims subject to non-statutory double patenting. Such requirements are not supported by any existing case law and implicate enforcement matters outside the USPTO’s purview.

### 4. The proposed rule raises due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment.

The nature of patents as property is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 261, which states: “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property. The [USPTO] shall

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4 686 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1982); 89 Fed. Reg. 40,439, 40,441
5 See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (considering terminal disclaimers in the context of 35 U.S.C. §§ 282 and 253 and concluding that “the invalidity of . . . claim 1 because of double patenting, even if true, does not necessarily require the invalidation of claims 5, 19, 40, and 43”).
maintain a register of interests in patents and applications for patents and shall record any document related thereto upon request, and may require a fee therefor.”

Since its establishment, the USPTO has promulgated regulations for the examination of patent applications and patent issuance. If the patent owner or a third party requested a reexamination of a patent, the patent owner did not have to surrender the issued patent. In essence, the patent remained enforceable during the USPTO reexamination proceeding and the patent owner retained the full property right in the patent. The Supreme Court, over 100 years ago, held that requiring surrender of a patent before issuance of a reissue patent would be, at least in the absence of a statutory authorization to do so, “to deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the executive.”7

McCormick Harvesting recognized that invalidating an issued patent, i.e., stripping the patent owner of a property right, requires certain procedural and evidentiary safeguards (i.e., review by an Article III court) to guarantee due process.

The proposed rule creates due process concerns because, in requiring a patent applicant to agree to the unenforceability of a patent if a single claim in another patent is rendered invalid, it effectively deprives patent owners of property rights without procedural and evidentiary safeguards to ensure due process. In fact, the rule would produce a result similar to Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd., in which the Federal Circuit, relying upon earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning unclean hands, found as a result of inequitable conduct, not only one, but each related patent, was unenforceable.8 The premise of the proposed rule would have a similar impact, without any evidentiary basis to support the finding other than a terminal disclaimer.

Furthermore, the rule is ambiguous about its retroactive effect on issued patents and pending applications in a family, especially any patent already subject to a terminal disclaimer that re-enters the USPTO via post grant activity such as a re-issue application and ex parte reexamination proceeding. Although not intended to be retroactive per se, the effect of filing a terminal disclaimer under the proposed rule in a great grandchild application would affect a great grandparent patent despite the great grandparent patent being filed years before the proposed rule’s implementation. Retroactive application of laws and rules can disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests. Innovators need certainty and predictability to make informed decisions and investments.

5. The proposed rule does not “facilitate and expedite the process of patent applications” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(C).

Section 2(b)(2)(C) of Title 35 requires that the USPTO “may establish regulations, not inconsistent with the law, which . . . shall facilitate and expedite the processing of patent applications.” (emphasis added). The USPTO acknowledges in the proposed rule that, because of the new requirement, applicants may not wish to file a terminal disclaimer to obviate non-statutory double patenting. The USPTO indicates four alternatives to addressing the issue, but each requires additional resources from the applicant, extending the time to issuance. Moreover, the proposed rule incentivizes applicants to challenge the non-statutory double patenting rejection to avoid filing the terminal disclaimer, thereby risking multiple patents being rendered unenforceable merely because one claim in a patent tied by a terminal disclaimer is found invalid, which will prolong processing applications. Finally, the proposed rule will slow prosecution by requiring applicants to submit a petition to withdraw a terminal disclaimer filed in an application that the applicant plans to

abandon. In the absence of a grantable petition, allowing an application with a terminal disclaimer to go abandoned will still result in the abandoned application tying together applications in the family, even though the abandoned application never issued as a patent.

II. THE PROPOSED RULE WILL CREATE SIGNIFICANT AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR PATENT APPLICANTS AND THE PATENT SYSTEM

1. The proposed rule weakens patent rights and creates opportunities for gamesmanship.

By linking the validity and enforceability of multiple patents through terminal disclaimers, the proposed rule introduces a new incentive for gamesmanship by patent challengers to exploit the interconnectedness within patent families. The rule would allow challengers to target just one claim in a connected patent family to potentially render the entire family unenforceable or invalid, regardless of whether that claim was the basis for the non-statutory double patenting rejection or has anything to do with the other claims in the family. Thus, the proposed rule has the potential to essentially shift patent validity adjudication for some patents from Article III courts to USPTO examiners who can issue non-statutory double patenting rejections without an evidentiary hearing or evaluating evidence that may be uncovered in the future. Shifting the authority to determine enforceability of issued patents from courts to examiners in this manner is likely to result in inconsistent and less robust evaluations compared to the thorough scrutiny provided by the courts and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).

2. The proposed rule will complicate patent examination and increase the cost of obtaining meaningful patent protection.

The proposed rule will likely result in applicants using new and expensive strategies to avoid the adverse effects of submitting terminal disclaimers, thereby risking multiple patents being rendered unenforceable merely because one claim in a patent tied by a terminal disclaimer is found invalid. Several of these possible strategies are detailed below.

As one example, applicants may begin filing large applications disclosing and claiming multiple aspects of a product or innovative technology, frequently referred to as “omnibus” or “jumbo” applications, to force restriction requirements and obtain protection from non-statutory double patenting rejections under the “Safe Harbor” of 35 U.S.C. § 121, removing the need for terminal disclaimers. This will likely result in applications containing more claims than allowed within the initial filing fees (20 total claims, 3 of which may be independent), further increasing the cost of obtaining meaningful patent protection and making examiners’ jobs more difficult and time-consuming.

Applicants may also contest USPTO restriction requirements more vigorously, increasing the number of petitions and placing more burdens on patent examiners and the USPTO. Restriction requirements may be appealed to the Technology Center Director, and if denied, reconsideration may be requested from the Office of the Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy. A patent owner may appeal to the courts only after being denied upon reconsideration. Despite the large financial burden, applicants may be more likely to litigate non-statutory double-patenting rejections rather than risk the broad loss of patent rights caused by filing a terminal disclaimer. Such financial burdens will be unduly shouldered by small companies and research institutions, with some universities perhaps foregoing technology transfer altogether given the costs.
The proposed rule overlooks the ethical duties of loyalty and diligent representation that patent attorneys and agents owe clients. The duty to act in the client’s best interest may compel practitioners to refrain from recommending or signing terminal disclaimers to prevent exposing entire patent families to the risk. Patent practitioners will likely change how patents are drafted, and inventions claimed, opting for alternatives to terminal disclaimers in prosecution, such as making claim amendments or appealing non-statutory double patenting rejections. Arguably, the proposed rule could impose an implicit ethical obligation on practitioners to avoid terminal disclaimers, leading to prolonged prosecution and increased expenses.

Furthermore, the proposed rule may discourage patent owners from using reexamination or reissue procedures to correct defects found in one patent in a family, because in some circumstances, disclaiming or fixing a claim in one patent could render unenforceable an entire family of patents linked by terminal disclaimers. This removes the existing incentives for patent owners to fix errors in their patent claims.

3. The proposed rule will stifle small businesses.

If the USPTO implements the proposed rule, companies of all sizes may be forced to adopt the strategies detailed above. Large, well-financed companies will likely spend more on prosecution to avoid terminal disclaimers. Small businesses, however, will have a harder time making greater financial investments to achieve meaningful patent protection.

Small businesses, which employ nearly half of the American workforce and represent over 40% of America’s GDP, traditionally have limited resources for protecting their intellectual property. If the proposed rule comes into effect, smaller companies may be forced to choose between increasing prosecution expenses or signing terminal disclaimers, accepting substantial risks to extended patent families to expedite allowance and manage prosecution costs.

Intellectual property is critical to a small business’ success. “Without patent protection many small businesses would simply be unable to compete with large corporations. Protecting that property early can be the difference between the success and failure of your entire enterprise.”

The exclusive marketing incentive offered by patents may be outweighed by the real and/or perceived risks of losing patent term and/or exclusivity periods, affecting innovation and investment in small business. This runs counter to the USPTO’s stated goal of promoting competition.

4. The proposed rule is inconsistent with recent Federal Circuit case law related to continuation and terminal disclaimer practice.

In In re Cellect, LLC, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether the judicially created doctrine of non-statutory double patenting could trump Congressionally authorized patent term adjustment (PTA) to...
compensate patent owners for USPTO delays during prosecution. While discussing the interconnection between non-statutory double patenting and terminal disclaimers, the Federal Circuit indicated that applicants should consider filing terminal disclaimers even in situations where examiners have not made non-statutory double patenting rejections. In other words, the Federal Circuit encouraged patent applicants/owners to proactively file terminal disclaimers, especially in situations where PTA is a consideration.

But the current proposed rule applies pressure on patent applicants to avoid filing terminal disclaimers to mitigate the likelihood that multiple patents could be held unenforceable merely because one claim in one of the multiple patents was rendered invalid. These conflicting incentives place patent applicants and patent owners in a Catch-22: following the Federal Circuit’s advice to file a terminal disclaimer to overcome a non-statutory double patenting rejection will risk rendering unenforceable an entire patent family tied by the terminal disclaimer.

5. **Continuation practice is essential to protect American innovation.**

Continuation practice is essential for ensuring patent applicants obtain protection on the full scope and variations of their inventions, as it is common for an invention disclosed in an application to have various features that can be included in the patent claims, and an applicant may believe that the first set of allowed claims does not capture the full scope of his or her invention. Pursuant to the statutory provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 120, continuation practice allows this examination process to “continue” beyond the initial patent filing and allowance of a single set of claims. When an applicant files a continuation application, the applicant and the examiner continue to work incrementally to best define the claims while still meeting the requirements of patentability. The practice of filing continuation applications permits a patent applicant to agree to one set of claims and then continue to pursue claims of different wording, scope, and variation that were either not presented or were not agreed upon in the initial examination.

Continuations do not extend the term of patents within the family. Subject to limited exceptions, a patent issued from a continuation application expires 20 years from its parent’s filing date, regardless of when the continuation was filed. A continuation cannot be used to claim an invention not disclosed in the parent application. See M.P.E.P. § 201.07. The parent application must provide written description and enabling support for the invention being claimed in the continuation application. 35 U.S.C. § 112. This rule limits the scope of continuation patent claims to inventions that were already disclosed in the parent’s specification.

Continuation practice has proven to be efficient; it enables patents to issue sooner and provides the public with clarity on the protected subject matter. Constricting continuation practice may result in applicants being less likely to agree to limit claims in a parent application. Without continuation

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13 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023). *In re Cellect* also illustrates that the question of non-statutory double patenting is not something only faced by applicants during prosecution but may also arise post-issuance, providing yet another example of how the proposed rule would have retroactive effect.

14 *Id.* at 1228-29

15 It is worth noting that restriction requirement appeals, including for denied petitions regarding restriction requirements, could lengthen delay periods, resulting in additional PTA. Current scrutiny and consideration to shorten PTA benefits for continuation applications in view of *In re Cellect* would only serve to further punish applicants seeking to obtain a patent quickly while appealing to the courts for a broader patent based on misapplication of 35 U.S.C. § 121 by the USPTO.

16 Patent term extension and patent term adjustment are mandated by 35 U.S.C. §§ 156 and 154, respectively, to provide extended patent terms beyond 20 years to account for, *inter alia*, the time needed to obtain regulatory approval by the FDA, and to compensate for USPTO delays.
practice, an initial set of claims may be more lengthy and multiple applications may be filed on the same day. Either would increase the burden on the USPTO and delay issuance of patents, reducing effective patent term for applicants.

III. CONCERNS ABOUT CONTINUATION PRACTICE IN DRUG PATENTS ARE MISPLACED

1. Continuations do not deter competition or delay entry of generic medicines.

A study published by the Initiative for Medicines, Access, and Knowledge called “Overpatented, Overpriced Curbing Patent Abuse: Tackling the Root of the Drug Pricing Crisis” (the I-MAK report) is commonly cited for the notion that patents directed to obvious variants of an invention are an underlying cause of rising drug prices.\(^{17}\) The I-MAK report, however, has been widely criticized as providing inaccurate and conclusory data, as well as failing to identify a sound methodology for arriving at its dataset.\(^{18}\) For example, Senator Thom Tillis criticized I-MAK’s information as being inaccurate by “orders of magnitude from public sources like the U.S. Orange Book and court filings” and asked the USPTO and FDA to conduct its own study on the topic.\(^{19}\)

The USPTO recently released a study containing data and reaching conclusions regarding that data that directly undermined I-MAK’s conclusions.\(^{20}\) The USPTO report correctly recognized that quantifying patents, patent applications, and exclusivities solely by raw numbers of possibly relevant patents is an inaccurate measure of a drug product’s intellectual property landscape due to varying scopes of patent claims and grants of regulatory exclusivities. The USPTO also recognized that multiple patents associated with a single marketed product are common in many innovative industries, not just pharmaceuticals.\(^{21}\) Finally, the USPTO acknowledged that the number of patents may not predict the actual launch timing of competing products.

Moreover, the USPTO noted discrepancies in many of I-MAK’s observations. For instance:


Although I-MAK asserts that patents have the effect of blocking generics for 30 to 50 years,\textsuperscript{22} the USPTO found that the “market exclusivity of the drug products ranged from about 3 to about 16 years.”\textsuperscript{23}

- The USPTO found no drugs with 200 patents and 40-year monopolies, contrary to I-MAK’s claims.
- The USPTO found only 3 patents for ELIQUIS®, whereas I-MAK counted 27.
- For REVLIMID®, the USPTO found only 27 patents and 16 years of exclusivity, not 96 patents and 40 years as claimed by I-MAK.
- According to the USPTO, LYRICA® has 3 patents and less than 15 years of exclusivity, not 68 patents and 32 years as claimed by I-MAK.

As the USPTO’s study demonstrates, I-MAK’s report contains vast discrepancies between the total number of patents and exclusivity periods and the official government data on the patents covering these drugs. The USPTO should ensure that I-MAK’s data no longer infects policy debates concerning drug patents and should engage in evidence-based policy making.

2. **Continuations do not result in increased litigation costs.**

There is no evidence to suggest the number of continuations is proportional to the amount of litigation for generic and biosimilar manufacturers. A generic or biosimilar manufacturer is only required to address or invalidate claims they are asserted to have infringed. There is no credible data establishing a firm correlation between the number of patents granted and the number of claims asserted in litigation against generic and biosimilar manufacturers. As an example, of the 88 patents granted that were directed to AbbVie’s IMBRUVICA®,\textsuperscript{24} only five claims were asserted against the generic manufacturer in litigation.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, the rule change is unnecessary given existing mechanisms to reduce the number of claims at issue and consolidate related patents into a single litigation to conserve judicial resources.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

IPO thanks the USPTO for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule and welcomes further dialogue on the issue. IPO recommends the USPTO withdraw the proposed rule to avoid the significant and unintended consequences to patent applicants and the patent system outlined above, as well as detrimental effects on innovation and competition.

Sincerely,

Krish Gupta
President

\textsuperscript{22} U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 20, at 61.
\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 57.