

March 5, 2021

Mr. Daniel Lee Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Innovation & Intellectual Property Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 600 17th St., NW Washington, DC 20508

# Re: Response to Questions, USTR 2021 Special 301 Review (Docket No. USTR-2020-0041)

Dear Mr. Lee:

Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) appreciates the U.S. Trade Representative's careful review of IPO's comment letter dated January 28, 2021 for the 2021 Special 301 Review, and the opportunity to provide clarifications in response to the questions posed by the U.S. Trade Representative. This letter takes up each question in turn:

# 1. "Please explain whether, and to what extent, the concerns expressed in your submission regarding India's National Manufacturing Policy (2011) and National Competition Policy (2011) were abated by India's National Intellectual Property Rights Policy (2016)."

### **Response**

### National Manufacturing Policy (2011)

India's National Manufacturing Policy (2011) suggested creation of a "Technology Acquisition and Development Fund" (TADF) to primarily incentivize Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) for green manufacturing. To facilitate and subsidise the access of green technologies to domestic MSMEs, the TADF was to create a patent pool and act as a licensing agency. With respect to compulsory licensing of green technologies, the Policy suggested that TADF "will have the option to approach the Government for issue of a Compulsory License…Such Compulsory License will be issued only within the provisions of TRIPS. Reasonable royalty will be paid to the patent holder."

India's National IPR Policy, 2016 does not directly deal with or provide any framework either on the issue of compulsory licensing or on commercialization of green technologies. With regard to commercialization of technologies, in general, through licensing, the step suggested in the IPR Policy is to "[p]romote licensing and technology transfer of IPRs; devising suitable contractual and licensing guidelines to enable commercialization of IPRs; promote patent pooling and cross licensing..." (Section 5.2). The 2016 IPR Policy does not specifically identify or elaborate on the role of TADF in licensing of patented technologies.

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General Counsel **Jeffrey Kochian** Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP It may be of interest to note that the TADF was launched by the Government of India in November 2015 (see <u>here</u>) under the National Manufacturing Policy to facilitate acquisition of "Clean, Green & Energy Efficient Technologies." It was further <u>extended</u> to provide funding support for domestic MSMEs. While it provided details for incentivizing green manufacturing, it did not deal with compulsory licensing of technologies.

## National Competition Policy (2011)

India's National IPR Policy, 2016 does not define the scope of 'essential facilities' or deal with any aspect of IP and platforms related to such essential facilities. In this regard, the IPR Policy provides only a general statement under the objective of "Enforcement and Adjudication" that "[1]icensing practices or conditions that may have an adverse effect on competition will be addressed through appropriate measures, including regulation of anti-competition conduct in the market by the Competition Commission of India."

It may be of interest to note that in 2020, a Draft Competition (Amendment) Bill was tabled, which is based on the recommendations of the Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC). The bill proposes an extension of the "IPR exemption" to "abuse of dominant position" cases under competition law, which exemption is currently available only to cases involving allegations of an agreement being anticompetitive. The IPR exemption is a right to "restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting" IP rights as a defense in such cases. The bill also expands the scope of the definition of IP to include "any other law for the time being in force relating to the protection of other intellectual property rights."

2. "Your submission states that India's patent working requirement "appears to include situations when patent holders import the related technology into the country, but do not locally manufacture it." Please explain how India's patent working requirement appears to include these situations and, if these situations occurred, provide information about these situations."

### **Response**

Thank you for posing this question, which suggests that IPO's original comment could be interpreted contrary to its intended meaning. It is not India's patent working requirement that "appears to include situations when patent holders import the related technology into the country, but do not locally manufacture it." It is failing to "work" one's invention in India, which "appears to include situations when patent holders import the related technology into the country, but do not locally manufacture it."

For ease of reference, the relevant extract of IPO's submission is provided below:

"In addition to the policies discussed above, patent holders risk compulsory licensing if they fail to "work" their inventions in India within three years of the respective patent grant. This appears to include situations when patent holders import the related technology into the country, but do not locally manufacture it."

It may be noted "[t]hat the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India" is an independent and stand-alone ground for seeking compulsory license in India. The (Indian) Patents Act or Rules do not provide an explicit clarification on whether or not importation of patented inventions into India amounts to "working" of such patented inventions in the territory of India. It seems rather likely, however, that mere importation may not amount to local working of patented invention from the following provisions:

- a. Indian Patents Act Section 83 (General principles applicable to working of patented inventions) provides the following general considerations:
  (a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay;
  (b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article;
- b. All Patentees and Licensees are required to submit a "Statement Regarding the Working of Patented Inventions on a Commercial Scale in India" (under statutory Form-27) at the Patent Office every year during the validity of patent. For the inventions worked in India, Form-27 requires a distinction between 'Manufacturing in India' and 'Importing into India'.

In the case of *La Renon Health Care Pvt., Ltd. vs. Union of India and Ors.* (10.01.2019), (2019)2MLJ718, the Court observed that "[i]f the invention that has been patented has not been put to use by way production and manufacture in India, the purpose for which the Patent was granted would stand defeated. The intention of the law is not to merely confer monopoly to an inventor to make disclosure in the specification and make claims and to flood the market without actual manufacture in the country. If the patented product is manufactured on overseas soil and imported into the country, the monopoly cannot remain. There could be compulsory licensing." (emphasis provided).

**3.** "Your submission lists "high burdens of proof" as one of various obstacles to effective civil enforcement against trade secret misappropriation in China. Have provisions of the amended Anti-Unfair Competition Law on burden shifting been helpful to date in that regard?"

# **Response**

The revision to Article 32 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law ("AUCL") addressing burden shifting aims to ease the element of proof regarding the act of the misappropriation (*i.e.*, the infringing act). For example, if a plaintiff provides preliminary evidence demonstrating that the alleged infringer had an opportunity to obtain the trade secret and the information used by the alleged infringer is substantively the same as the trade secret, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it did not commit infringement.

However, the challenge with high evidentiary burden also exists with respect to proof of the existence of the trade secret. PRC courts in practice require a high level of specificity before recognition of a trade secret, which in some instances is even held to standards mimicking patentability requirements, *e.g.*, requiring a company to explain the novelty and technical superiority of its claimed trade secret.

Compounding this issue are the tedious and lengthy legalization requirements for certain foreign evidence, which often lead to admissibility issues and delayed ability to enforce. While the new PRC Evidence Law has largely eased notarization and legalization requirements, at this time documents such as Powers of Attorney and Certificates of an Authorized Representative (which are necessary to initiate a civil litigation) still require notarization and legalization. In instances where there are several months of delay in the legalization process, an owner's likelihood of obtaining a preliminary injunction in the form of a conduct preservation order decreases as it becomes difficult to prove urgency. In another instance where lengthy legalization led to delay in an owner's ability to bring action, a court questioned the commercial value of the claimed business secret as having become "stale" due to the delayed enforcement.

Therefore, while the amended AUCL's burden shifting provision can be leveraged to ease the burden of proof regarding the act of infringement, challenges remain with regards to proving the existence of the trade secret and evidentiary hurdles for effective enforcement.

4. "Your submission notes that, in July 2020, Indonesia issued Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020 on government use of compulsory licenses "without consulting stakeholders and the final form contains various concerning provisions." Please elaborate on the "various concerning provisions" in Presidential Regulation No. 77/2020."

# **Response**

While the government must notify the patent holder when a request for compulsory license is accepted for review, we are not aware of a formal procedure allowing patent holders to dispute claims in a request or recommend alternatives. The regulation doesn't expressly permit or prohibit imports or exports of products manufactured under a compulsory license. Additionally, the right holder must continue to pay fees to maintain the patent if a CL is granted to address emergency needs.

5. "You stated that "given India's appointment as an International Search Authority for the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), it is possible that the requirement to furnish examination results for co-pending applications conflicts with PCT rules." Please explain how the requirement to furnish examination results for co-pending applications

# potentially conflicts with PCT rules and, if conflicts have occurred, provide information about the conflicts."

## **Response**

Article 42 of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) provides that:

"<u>No elected Office</u> receiving the international preliminary examination report <u>may</u> require that the applicant furnish copies, or information on the contents, of any papers connected with the examination relating to the same international application in any other elected Office." (emphasis provided)

India's requirement (for furnishing examination results for co-pending applications in other elected states) may be in conflict with Article 42 in cases where India is an elected office receiving the international preliminary examination report. For greater clarity, however, the relevant sentence in IPO's submission may be amended as below:

"In fact, given India's appointment as an International Search Authority for the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), iIt is possible that the requirement to furnish examination results for co-pending applications conflicts with PCT rules."

6. "Your submission provides that "anti-suit injunctions have arguably tipped the scales in favor of state-owned businesses" in China. Have anti-suit injunction proceedings in that involve state-owned businesses been different from proceedings that do not involve state-owned businesses?"

### **Response**

Anti-suit injunctions (ASI) are a developing issue in patent litigation. Accordingly, this is the first year that IPO has included this topic in its comments for the U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301 Comments. It is too early to tell whether anti-suit injunction proceedings that involve state-owned businesses will differ from proceedings that do not involve state-owned businesses. What is clear at this time is that the topic is developing in the context of global standard essential patent (SEP) enforcement, FRAND licensing and royalty-rate setting, where Chinese courts have started to force non-Chinese entities to have global royalty rates set by Chinese courts. In some of the initial cases, this has benefited Chinese entities that the U.S. government has declared are "Communist Chinese military companies" to the disadvantage of non-Chinese entities.

A question has also been raised about whether U.S. entities are at a procedural disadvantage compared to Chinese entities, including in multi-jurisdictional disputes involving standard essential patents or anti-suit injunctions. These disadvantages include what some perceive as the Chinese Courts' willingness to act "without adequate

notice or procedural transparency" to protect favored Chinese entities,  $^1$  in comparison to judicial processes in the U.S.<sup>2</sup> and other non-Chinese forums.<sup>3</sup>

IPO also notes that the notarization and legalization processes (*see* response to question 3 above) build in months of delay for foreign entities, which challenges are not faced by Chinese entities.

IPO is concerned about these issues and will be carefully monitoring them as they develop.

We again thank the USTR for reviewing IPO's original comments and posing these six questions for clarification. IPO would welcome any further dialogue or opportunity to provide additional information to assist your efforts in developing the 2021 Special 301 Report.

Sincerely,

Daniel J. Staudt President

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> *See, e.g.*, <u>https://chinaipr.com/2018/07/04/semiconductor-patent-litigation-part-2-nationalism-transparency-and-rule-of-law/;</u>

https://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/Veeco+Instruments+(VECO)+Reports+Update+on+Patent+Litiga tion/13580962.html; https://chinaipr.com/2020/12/28/wuhan-and-anti-suit-injunctions/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corporation et al., No. 1:2014cv04988 - Document 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2014cv04988/429153/118/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Interdigital Technology Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp., Delhi High Court, 9 October 2020, I.A. 8772/2020 in CS(COMM) 295/2020, https://caselaw.in/delhi/injunction-interdigital-technology-xiaomi-corporation/18668/.